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I. INTRODUCTION

Credit has become a virtual necessity for the American public.1 In
an inflationary economy, credit has become more than a means of
improving consumers' standards of living; many would be unable to
survive financially without credit.2 The tremendous growth in the use
of credit 3 has revealed numerous discriminatory practices in the
credit-granting process. 4 Such practices provided the impetus for ma*Associate Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor & Ruppel, P.A., Clearwater, Florida. B.A., 1979,
Vanderbilt University; J.D., 1983, University of Florida College of Law.
1. Without credit, most consumers would be unable to acquire what are often considered
basic elements of the American way of life - an education, a car, a home. See Reizenstein, A
Fresh Look at the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON L. REV. 215, 215 (1980); Taylor,
Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Sta-

tistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 73, 73 (1980); Comment, Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 203, 203 (1977).
2. See Comment, Equal Credit For All - An Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 326, 326 (1978).
3. See Taylor, supra note 1,.at 73; Comment, supra note 2, at 326. Between 1970 and
1983 the amount of outstanding consumer credit increased from $143.1 billion to $433.9 billion.
US. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1984 518 (104th ed.
1983). Over the same period the outstanding consumer mortgage debt increased from $474 billion to $1,680 billion. Id. at 517.
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CRErriN Tm UNITED
STATES 152-53 (1973) (highlighting the problems faced by women in obtaining credit).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

jor congressional review of the credit industry in the early 1970s.'
As a result of its inquiry,6 Congress concluded that federal legislation was needed to insure that businesses extend credit to consumers
based on their creditworthiness, rather than their sex or marital status. 7 That conclusion produced the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA),s which prohibits credit-granting institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex or marital status9 and provides for civil
liability. Within five months of its effective date 0 Congress broadened the scope" of the ECOA to prohibit the consideration of race,
color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or good faith exercise of rights guaranteed under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. iS
In amending the ECOA, 13 Congress established three methods of
enforcement. First, Congress empowered various federal agencies to
enforce the provisions of the ECOA. 14 The Federal Trade Commis5. See generally Credit Discrimination:Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, Part 1,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1974); Economic Problems of Women: HearingsBefore the Joint Economic Comm., Pt. 3, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1973).
6. Although credit is a privilege rather than a right, see Taylor, supra note 1, at 73; Comment, supra note 2, at 327, Congress recognized that credit should be granted or denied based
on an applicants' creditworthiness, not their membership in a particular class. Reizenstein,
supra note 1, at 219-20.
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 note (1982) (Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose).
8. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974), amended by
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976)
(currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982)).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a), 1691e (Supp. V 1975). Creditors are permitted to inquire about
an applicant's spouse in the following limited circumstances: (1) if the spouse will be permitted
to use the account; (2) if the spouse will be contractually liable on the account; (3) if the applicant is relying on the spouse's income as a means to repay the credit requested; (4) if the
applicant lives in a community property state or the property on which the applicant is relying
as a means of repaying the credit requested is located in a community property state; or (5) the
applicant is relying on separate maintenance payments, alimony, or child support as a means of
repaying the requested credit. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2) (1983).
10. The ECOA became effective on October 28, 1975. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 note (1982) (effective date).
11. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251
(1976).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1982). Regulation B permits creditors to consider age in certain limited circumstances. Creditors may consider the age of an elderly applicant as long as
age is used in the applicant's favor. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2) (1983). In addition creditors can
consider whether the applicant is of the age to enter into a binding contract. Id. In credit
scoring systems age may be used as a predictive variable so long as the age of elderly applicants
is not assigned a negative value. Id. In a judgmental system creditors may consider age only for
the purpose of determining a pertinent element of creditworthiness. Id.
13. Congress determined that "strong enforcement of [the ECOA] is essential to accomplish its purposes." S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWs

14.

403, 415 [hereinafter cited as

SENATE REPORT].

See 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a) (1982).
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sion (FTC) was granted general enforcement authority over those
credit-granting institutions not specifically within the purview of the
other enumerated federal agencies."5 Second, the amendments empowered the United States Attorney General to initiate civil proceedings either upon the referral by another agency, or upon an independent investigation of a potential ECOA violation."l Third, Congress
authorized individual and class action suits for ECOA violations, permitting recovery of both actual and punitive damages.' 7 Congress intended for these private actions to be the chief method of enforcing

the ECOA.'1
Despite congressional intent and the liberal relief provisions of
the ECOA,' 9 there has been a relative dearth of private actions
brought under the Act. 20 The reasons most often advanced to explain
the paucity of private actions include: (1) the specificity of the Federal Reserve Board's 21 regulations concerning the scope of permissible inquiry in evaluating credit applications, which has facilitated
compliance with the Act; 2 (2) the ECOA's lack of a minimum recovery provision;23 (3) the difficulty in proving actual damages suffered
as a result of an ECOA violation; 24 (4) the difficulty in bringing class
actions;2" and (5) plaintiffs' increasing reliance on difficult disparate
15. See id. § 1691c(c). The institutions the FTC oversees include retail stores and consumer finance companies. Braasch, Miller & Rice, Equal Credit Opportunity, 35 Bus. LAW.
1237, 1241 n.35 (1980).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g), (h) (1982).
17. See id. § 1691e(a)-(d).
18. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13.
19. See Gorman, Enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 37 Bus. LAW. 1335,
1336 (1982). Creditors who fail to comply with the ECOA or Regulation B are liable to aggrieved credit applicants individually or as members of a class. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1982).
In addition, creditors violating the ECOA or Regulation B can be held liable for punitive damages. Id. § 1691e(b). Creditors' punitive damage liability to individuals is limited to $10,000,
and their punitive damage liability to a class is limited to a lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the
creditor's net worth. Id. Aggrieved credit applicants can also apply to courts for equitable and
declaratory relief necessary to enforce the Act. Id. § 1691e(c). Finally, if an ECOA plaintiff is
successful in obtaining actual or punitive damages or equitable or declaratory relief, that plaintiff can recover costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. § 1691e(d).
20. Gorman, supra note 19, at 1336; Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 246. As of July 1982
there had been only 26 reported ECOA suits filed in federal courts and 21 unreported decisions.
Id. at 1336. See also Rohner, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 34 Bus. LAW. 1423, 1424 (1979).
21. The ECOA authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a). Pursuant to this
authority the Board promulgated Regulation B, a detailed set of regulations governing the
credit application and evaluation process as well as applicant notification. See 12 C.F.R.

§8

202.1-.13, 202.601-.1104 (1983).

22. Rohner, supra note 20, at 1424.
23.
24.

Id.

Thornton, The Not-So-Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 5 ORANGE CTY. B.J. 363, 373
(1978).
25. Gorman, supra note 19, at 1348-49.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

impact or "effects test" challenges."6
This paper addresses the difficulties private plaintiffs face in
bringing actions under the ECOA, focusing particularly on problems
concerning remedies, class actions and burdens of proof. The relative
ineffectiveness of private action as the chief method of enforcement
undercuts the successful implementation of the Act's policies.17 To
further proper enforcement of the ECOA two steps must be taken.
First, because of the resources available to government agencies governmental enforcement should be increased. Second, statutory and
regulatory reforms are required to ameliorate the problems plaintiffs
face in bringing private actions under the ECOA.
II. PRIVATE SUITS UNDER THE ECOA
A. The Remedies Problem
The ECOA authorizes three types of damage awards for successful
private plaintiffs: actual damages, punitive damages, and court costs
and attorneys' fees.28 The Act places no limit on the actual damages
recoverable by injured plaintiffs, either individually or as a class, 29
and permits liberal punitive damage recoveries.3 0 To further private
enforcement of the Act, courts have liberally construed these damage
provisions.
Courts interpreting the ECOA's actual damage provision have declared that successful plaintiffs can recover for injury to their credit
rating, 31 as well as damages for embarrassment, humiliation and emo26. Rohner, supra note 20, at 1424. The judicially developed effects test determines
whether employment discrimination has occurred in suits brought under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1976). The legislative history of the ECOA indicates
that Congress intended the effects test, as developed in Title VII cases, to be available to
ECOA plaintiffs to prove discrimination in the credit application and evaluation process. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 406. Under the effects test an ECOA plaintiff can prove a
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that a creditor's practice results in disparate treatment of or has a disparate effect on the applicant. See generally Blakely, Credit Opportunity For Women: The ECOA and Its Effects, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 655, 669-89 (discussing
case law involving disparate impact under Title VII).
27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a), (b), (d) (1982). The ECOA also authorizes plaintiffs to seek equitable and declaratory relief. Id. § 1691e(c).
29. See id. § 1691e(a).
30. See id. In the original ECOA the limit placed on punitive damages iii suits brought as
class actions was the lesser of $100,000 or 1% of the creditor's net worth. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c)
(Supp. V 1975). When the ECOA was amended, that limit was increased to the lesser of
$500,000 or 1% of the creditor's net worth. Id. § 1691e(b) (1982). The original limit of $10,000
placed on punitive damages in suits by individuals has remained the same. Id.
31. See, e.g., Shuman v. Stamdard Oil Co. of Cal., 453 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
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tional distress.8 2 Similarly, courts have interpreted the punitive damage and attorneys' fees provisions broadly. Plaintiffs need not prove
actual damages 33 or demonstrate willful violation of the ECOA's provisions in order to recover punitive damages.' Rather, courts have
required plaintiffs to meet a less demanding "reckless disregard"
standard in proving entitlement to punitive damages.3 5
Despite judicial attempts to afford plaintiffs relief for ECOA violations, the insubstantial actual and punitive damage recoveries generally awarded.successful plaintiffs, coupled with the difficult burden
of proof plaintiffs must carry, undercut successful private enforcement of the ECOA. Courts interpreting the ECOA actual damages
provisions have consistently declared that actual damages, which are
often minimal, 6 will not be presumed but must be proved. 7
Emotional harm presents particularly difficult proof problems.3 8
One court concluded a plaintiff's credible testimony that she had
been embarrassed and humiliated by the creditor's actions was sufficient proof of actual damage.3 9 Another court, however, reached the
32. See Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835, 841 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Owens v. Magee Fin.
Serv. of Bogalusa, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 758, 770 (E.D. La. 1979); Shuman v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 453 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1978). To recover damages for emotional harm, plaintiffs need not prove any out-of-pocket loss. See, e.g., Sayers, 522 F. Supp. at 841.
33. Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982); Cherry v. Amoco Oil
Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Smith v. Lakeside Foods, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 170,
172 (N.D. IM. 1978).
34. See Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982); Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 422 F. Supp. 835, 841 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Shuman v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 453 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-55 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The Shuman court first discussed the
standard of proof required for recovery of punitive damages. The court analyzed the legislative
history of the 1976 amendments and concluded Congress intentionally omitted willfulness from
that standard. Id. at 1155. The court then declared that the most sensible reading of the statute required adoption of the reckless disregard standard as opposed to a specific intent standard. Id. The adopted standard would punish creditors for blameworthy conduct and at the
same time impose on plaintiffs a lesser burden than would a specific intent standard. See id.
35. See, e.g., Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d at 1278.
36. See, e.g., Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity - An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus.
LAw. 1641, 1643 (1976); Comment, supra note 2, at 355. In fact, actual damages may only be
the cost a plaintiff incurs in locating a second creditor. To Amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before the Sub-Committee on Consumer Affairs of the
Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975) (statement of
Sheldon Feldman, Ass't Dir. for Special Statutes, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
37. See Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d at 1277-78; Shuman v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 453 F. Supp. at 1154, citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978).
38. Cf. Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 247 (violations easier to prove than actual damages);
Comment, supra note 2, at 355 (actual damages difficult to estimate or prove).
39. Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. at 841, citing Smith v.
Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Owens v. Magee Fin. Serv. of Bogalusa, Inc., 476 F. Supp. at 768, 770 (lenders refusal to extend credit without borrower's signing
of release of other claims constitutes violation of ECOA); Shuman v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
453 F. Supp. at 1154 (divorced female twice denied oil company credit card may recover for
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opposite conclusion.4 ° Even if plaintiffs' testimony regarding embarrassment and humiliation caused by a creditor is deemed adequate to
justify a damage award, emotional harm is difficult to quantify.4 '
This difficulty, compounded by the traditional reluctance of courts to
award damages for speculative injuries, makes it unlikely that plaintiffs will receive any substantial recovery for emotional distress.
In addition to overcoming these barriers to the recovery of actual
damages, plaintiffs must prove reckless disregard on the defendant's
part to receive punitive damages. Creditors' increasing use of credit
scoring systems4 2 makes proving reckless disregard of the ECOA applicant evaluation provisions' s more difficult because these systems
determine creditworthiness through computerized evaluation of objective criteria." Moreover, increasing creditor awareness of the
ECOA's application, notification, and credit extension provisions 5
decreases the likelihood that creditors will recklessly disregard those
humiliation and mental distress).
40. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. at 1029. The differing facts of Sayers and
Cherry may explain the conflicting conclusions reached by those courts. In Sayers the plaintiff's humiliation arose from an embarrassing encounter with one of the defendant's employees.
See infra note 53-60 and accompanying text. However, the Cherry plaintiff could point to no
specific incident which caused her to suffer emotional harm. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490
F. Supp. at 1029. For this reason the Cherry court might have concluded that the plaintiff's
testimony was inadequate to establish actual damages.
41. See, e.g., Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. at 841; Comment,
supra note 2, at 355.
42. See Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 237; Taylor, supra note 1, at 116 n.154. Creditors
generally evaluate applicants based on one of two types of evaluation systems. A credit scoring
system is a credit applicant evaluation system that uses empirical methods to predict statistically the likelihood that a credit applicant will repay his debt. Taylor, supra note 1, at 88.
Under such a system points are assigned to various financial and nonfinancial attributes of the
applicants, and they are granted credit if their point total is greater than a predetermined
amount. Id. In contrast, a judgmental system "involves a subjective process whereby a credit
manager looks at the applicant's personal characteristics and other information and evaluates
the applicant's ability and willingness to repay." Id. at 86. For an indepth analysis of credit
scoring systems see Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 371 (1978).
43. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (1983).
44. In order for a credit scoring system to be sanctioned by the Federal Reserve Board it
must be both empirically derived and demonstratively and statistically sound. See 12 C.F.R. §
202.2, at 17 (1983). A credit scoring system meets the first requirement (empirically derived) if
credit applicants' scores are "derived from an empirical comparison of sample groups or the
population of creditworthy and non-creditworthy applicants of a creditor . . ." and if those
scores "determine, alone or in conjunction with an evaluation of additional information about
the applicant, whether an applicant is deemed creditworthy." Id. To satisfy the demonstratively and statistically sound requirement of 12 C.F.R. § 202.2, a credit scoring system must
meet the four requirements of that subsection. Two of those requirements are that the system
separate "creditworthy and non-creditworthy applicants at a statistically significant rate" and
that the system be "periodically revalidated as to its predictive ability ....
Id.
45. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.5, 202.7, 202.9 (1983).
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provisions."
In Vander Missen v. Kellogg-Citizens National Bank of Green
Bay47 the court interpreted the ECOA's punitive damage provision.4"
That provision lists factors to be considered by courts in determining
the amount of punitive damage awards. Among the factors listed are
"the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, . . . the number of persons adversely affected and the extent to
'
The
which the creditors failure of compliance was intentional."49
plaintiff in Vander Missen argued that these factors should be used
in determining the punitive damages to be awarded in a suit brought
by an individual plaintiff.5 0 The court concluded, however, that the
factors listed in the punitive damage provision are intended to protect creditor-defendants in class actions from excessive recoveries
rather than to aid individual plaintiffs in proving punitive damages.5 1
The Vander Missen court further construed the ECOA punitive
damage provision to prohibit inquiry into the defendant's actions
with respect to previous and subsequent credit applicants.5 2 Thus, a
plaintiff seeking punitive damages must restrict his claim to reckless
disregard of ECOA provisions committed during the plaintiff's transactions with the creditor. This construction effectively limits punitive
damage recoveries, thereby decreasing the deterrent impact punitive
damages will have on creditors.
Even if plaintiffs are successful in proving actual and punitive
damages, their recoveries are unlikely to be substantial. This conclusion is supported by the court's damage award in Sayers v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.5 3 In Sayers the defendant rejected the
plaintiff's application for credit, giving specific reasons for that rejection.5 4 One of the reasons given was an erroneous statement that the
plaintiff had a "'foreclosure, repossession, suit or bankruptcy' in her
credit history. ' 55 When the plaintiff went to the defendant's place of
business to have the error corrected, she was embarrassed and humiliated by one of the defendant's employees who acknowledged the er46. Cf. Rohner, supra note 20, at 1424 (discussing minimal litigation under ECOA). Even
if a plaintiff is able to prove reckless disregard on the part of a creditor, that plaintiff will only
be able to recover punitive damages based on the creditor's reckless violations committed during the plaintiff's credit transactions.
47. 481 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1982).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1982).
50. 481 F. Supp. at 744, 746.

51. Id. at 746, 748.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
522 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
Id. at 837.

55. Id.
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ror but rudely refused to correct it. 6 Based on these facts the court
found that the defendant had recklessly disregarded a provision of
Regulation B. 57 The court awarded the plaintiff $500 in actual damages and $500 in punitive damages.5 8
Such insubstantial recoveries undercut effective private enforcement of the ECOA in two ways. First, plaintiffs are unlikely to bring
private actions against creditors unless they can be assured of significant recovery. Second, insubstantial damage awards are unlikely to
deter creditors from discriminating against credit applicants. However, the deterrent potential of damage awards could be greatly enhanced through plaintiffs' successful use of class actions.
B. Class Actions Under the ECOA
When Congress amended the ECOA in 1976, raising the punitive
damage ceiling for class actions under the ECOA,5 9 it recognized the
value of the class action as an enforcement tool.6 0 Congress, however,
acknowledged the difficulties plaintiffs would face in complying with
the procedural requirements applicable to class actions.61
To institute a class action in federal court, ECOA plaintiffs must
first fulfill the four requirements specified in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 2 Rule 23(a) provides that one or more
members of a class may sue if:
56. Id. at 838.
57. Id. at 837. Regulation B, supra note 21, requires that a creditor notify an applicant of
his approval for credit or of adverse action taken regarding his application within 30 days after
receipt of the completed application. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(1) (1983). Notification of adverse action
must contain the following: a statement of the action taken; a statement of the ECOA's prohibition of discrimination; the name and address of the federal agency responsible for ensuring
that creditor's compliance with the Act; and either a statement of the specific reasons for the
action taken or a disclosure of the applicant's right to receive a statement of reasons upon
request made within 60 days of receipt of the adverse action notice. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(2).
58. 522 F. Supp. at 842. The Sayers decision evidences both the judicial reluctance to
award substantial amounts for emotional harm and the likelihood of insubstantial punitive
damage recoveries for individual plaintiffs despite reckless violations by creditors.
59. See supra note 30.
60. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 416; Gorman, supra note 19, at 1349; Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 235; Thornton, supra note 24, at 374.
61. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 416. Plaintiffs generally have to fulfill the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a class action in federal
court. See Commentary, The Magnuson-Moss Act Class Action Provisions:Consumer's Remedy or an Empty Promise?, 70 GEo. L.J. 1399, 1401 (1982). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally presumed to apply to actions brought under federal statutes, id. at 1409 n.61
(citing federal court cases), unless Congress has expressed the intent to modify the applicability
of the Rules to a particular statute. Id. at 1409-10. In passing and amending the ECOA, Congress does not appear to have expressed any such intent.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.6
To satisfy the nmerosity requirement of 23(a)(1), ECOA plaintiffs
must represent a class of sufficient size, 64 and those representative
plaintiffs bear the burden of showing impracticability 5 The commonality and typicality requirements of 23(a)(2) and (3) are likely to
be satisfied if the class brings suit against a single creditor or alleges
that particular standardized practices of a creditor violated the
ECOA.6 Finally, to satisfy 23(a)(4), representative plaintiffs must
demonstrate their representative qualifications, assuring the court
that no conflicting interests
exist between themselves and the re67
mainder of the class.
Assuming the requirements of 23(a) are satisfied, ECOA plaintiffs
must also demonstrate that their class action falls within one of the
three 23(b) categories.68 Under Rule 23(b)(1), a class action may lie if
the prosecution of separate claims by individual class members would
create the possibility of (A) inconsistent adjudications producing "incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class" or
(B) adjudications "dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications." 6 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is intended to
prevent courts from ordering a defendant to take inconsistent actions.70 Inconsistent damage awards, however, are not inconsistent
adjudications within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) .7 Because
63. Id.
64. Although court holdings are inconsistent with respect to the size of the class adequate
to meet the numerosity requirement of 23(a)(1), courts have held classes with as few as 35 and
40 members satisfy 23(a)(1). See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
1762, at 594 (1972). Other factors that courts examine to determine whether 23(a)(1) is satisfied
include: "the nature of the action, the size of the individual claims, the location of the members
of the class or the property that is the subject matter of the dispute," and, in appropriate cases,
the impossibility of obtaining personal jurisdiction over some of the members of the class. Id. at
600.
65. Id. at 594. Wright and Miller state that impracticability may be shown by financial
difficulty faced by individual plaintiffs in bringing suit. Id. at 602.
66. See id.§ 1763, at 606, § 1764, at 614. Courts have been quite permissive in applying
23(a)(2) and 23(a)(3). Id. § 1763, at 604, § 1764, at 613.
67. Id. § 1765, at 619 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir.
1968)).
68. See Commentary, supra note 61, at 1404.
69. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
70. Commentary, supra note 61, at 1405.
71. Id. at 1405 n.33 (citing federal cases).
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ECOA actions are generally suits for damages, it is unlikely that
ECOA class actions will fall within 23(b)(1)(A)7 2
For a class action to fall within either of these two categories
plaintiffs must be seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against a
defendant who has "acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class."'7 s Although the ECOA allows plaintiffs to seek
equitable or declaratory relief,7 4 ECOA plaintiffs are more likely to
seek credit from another financial institution and sue the discriminating creditor for damages.
If ECOA plaintiffs are to have a class action certified, the third
category of 23(b) seems the most viable alternative. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate" and that a class action be "superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. '75 As under 23(a)(2), ECOA plaintiffs suing the same creditor for alleged practices violative of the ECOA would likely satisfy
the first requirement of 23(b)(3) because their claims would be quite
similar.7 6 To satisfy the second prerequisite of 23(b)(3), ECOA plaintiffs could argue that the small recoveries traditionally afforded individual plaintiffs deter initiation of otherwise valid causes of action,7 7
thus rendering the class action the superior method of adjudication. 78
Even if a potential class action satisfies the Rule 23(b) requirements, ECOA representative plaintiffs must also bear the considerable cost of supplying "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. '17 ECOA representative plaintiffs whose individual recovery is likely to be relatively small would
72. See id. Since ECOA actions will typically not fall within 23(b)(1)(A) they are also
unlikely to satisfy 23(b)(1)(B). See supra note 64, § 1772, at 4-5.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Professors Wright and Miller acknowledge that several courts
have allowed class actions to proceed under 23(b)(2) if they find that injunctive or declaratory
relief predominates over damages sought in the action. See supra note 64, § 1775, at 22-23.
However, Wright and Miller state that disputes over which type of relief predominates are a
useless expenditure of judicial resources. Id. at 23. The authors suggest that if a class action
meets the 23(a) prerequisites and requests injunctive or declaratory relief, it should be certified
under 23(b)(2). Id.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (1982).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
76. See supra note 64, § 1763, at 610.
77. See Gorman, supra note 19, at 1349.
78. See supra note 64, § 1779, at 61; Commentary, supra note 61, at 1406-07.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156 (1974), interpreted this provision to require class representatives to bear the cost of notice
to all class members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Id. at 173. Congress specifically recognized the burden of this notice requirement as a significant deterrent to ECOA
class actions when it amended the ECOA in 1976. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 416.
Congress noted the need to investigate alternatives to the class action to enforce the ECOA. Id.
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probably be unwilling to bear the cost of such notice. Apparently,
therefore, even the most appropriate category of 23(b) class actions
will not be pursued because of the burdensome notice requirement.8 s
The preceding discussion reveals that the difficulties of satisfying
Rule 23 all but eliminate the class action as an ECOA enforcement
tool.81 Without the class action, private enforcement is significantly
undermined as an effective deterrent of discrimination in the creditgranting process."2 Moreover, the effectiveness of individual actions
as an enforcement device is diminished by the burdens ECOA plaintiffs face in proving creditor liability as well as by the insubstantial
damages normally awarded individual plaintiffs.
C. Plaintiffs' Burden of Proof in ECOA DiscriminationSuits
The reported ECOA cases reveal two methods by which a plaintiff
can prove discrimination under the Act. In cases involving a creditor
practice or system which clearly violates the Act or which is obviously discriminatory, plaintiffs must only prove actual occurrence of
the alleged act. Absent such an obvious violation or discriminatory
act, an aggrieved applicant must demonstrate that an otherwise permissible practice or system disproportionately effects a protected
class. 83
While plaintiffs face a relatively light burden in proving an obvious violation of the ECOA, 4 the expanding use of credit scoring sys80. See supra note 24, at 374.
81. See Gorman, supra note 19, at 2348-49.
82. Some commentators argue that the unavailability of the class action as a consumer
law enforcement device is appropriate. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES 40-48 (1973) (statement of Ira M. Milistein).
Millstein argues that the role of class action enforcement of consumer laws as a deterrence
mechanism is improper. Id. Millstein contends this use of the class action device is inappropriate because class actions should be a "means for securing redress of actual consumer grievances." Id. However, Millstein's views are contrary to those of Congress, which apparently gave
its approval to the use of class actions as a deterrent in enforcing the ECOA. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 416.
83. Rohner, supra note 20, at 1428.
84. In Smith v. Lakeside Foods, 449 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. IlM. 1978), the plaintiff applied for
credit at a grocery store. Id. at 172. The defendant's loan application failed to indicate that
designating the appropriate courtesy title was optional for applicants. Id. The defendant was
thus in clear violation of a Regulation B provision requiring creditors to indicate that designation of a courtesy title on loan applications is optional. Id. If the defendant in Smith had not
admitted the defect in his loan application, the plaintiff would merely have had to introduce
her loan application to prove her case.
In Owens v. Magee Fin. Serv. of Bogalusa, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. La. 1979), the
plaintiff applied for and received two loans from the defendant. Id. at 760. During the negotiations for a third loan the defendant's employee requested the plaintiff to sign a release of the
Truth-in-Lending Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (1982)) claims she had brought with
respect to one of the prior loan transactions. 476 F. Supp. at 760-61. This request was a clear
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tems8 5 and creditors' increasing experience with ECOA provisions
will curtail the frequency of such patent violations.8 6 ECOA plaintiffs
will therefore have to rely increasingly on the effects test 7 authorized
by Regulation B of the ECOA. This test essentially prohibits any
credit practice that disparately impacts a protected class. 8
Courts, commentators, and federal agencies have recognized that
establishing a prima facie case under the effects test presents a difficult challenge.8 ' Plaintiffs must show the disparate effect of a creditor's facially neutral practice" by demonstrating a significant discrepancy between the number of protected class members in the
creditor's entire applicant pool and the number of protected class
members to whom the creditor has actually extended credit.9 1 Once
the plaintiff makes this showing, the defendant creditor can establish
an affirmative defense by proving that the challenged practice is necessary to determine creditworthiness. 2 If the creditor meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that a less discriminatory means
could have been used to predict creditworthiness."'
The primary obstacle to successfully proving disparate impact is
the necessity of showing a statistical discrepancy sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co. 94 illustrates the diffiviolation of the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1982), and Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.2(z),
202.4, 202.5(a) (1983), which prohibit a creditor from discriminating against an applicant because of his good faith exercise of rights under the Consumer Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16011691 (1982). The Owens plaintiff offered adequate proof of the violation by entering the signed
release into evidence and eliciting testimony from one of the defendant's loan officers concerning the transaction. 476 F. Supp. at 760, 768. The court suggested that even if the plaintiff
failed to prove that the defendant conditioned the third loan on release of her Truth-in-Lending Act claims, she could have recovered for an ECOA violation. Id. at 768. Plaintiff could have
recovered on proof of her reasonable feeling that relinquishing her Truth-in-Lending Act claims
was necessary for her to receive her loan. Id. The court stated that such proof would be sufficient to demonstrate a violation of 23 C.F.R. 202.5(a) (1982), which prohibits discouraging applications on a prohibited basis. These two cases demonstrate that ECOA plaintiffs should have
little difficulty proving creditor liability in obvious violation cases.
85. See supra note 42 (discussing credit scoring systems).
86. See Rohner, supra note 20, at 1424. See also Note Credit Scoring and the ECOA:
Applying the Effects Test, 88 YALE L.J. 1450, 1451 (1979) (objective screening does not eliminate disparate impact). But see Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 246.
87. See supra note 26.
88. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 at 22 n.7 (1983).
89. See Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835, 839 (W.D. Mo.
1981); Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980); 42 Fed. Reg. 1242,
1246 (1977); Federal Trade Comrn'n Comments on Credit Scoring 1979, reprinted in 5 CONG.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 97,663 at 87, 110 (1979); Rohner, supra note 20, at 1428; Note, supra note
86, at 1463-65.
90. See, e.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 240.
94. 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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culties encountered by ECOA plaintiffs. In Cherry, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's use of zip code ratings in its credit scoring
discriminated against applicants on the basis of race.9 5 The plaintiff,
however, was unable to make the necessary statistical showing to
prove that the zip code ratings had a disproportionate impact on income-qualified blacks.9 6 In fact, the Cherry court acknowledged that
it would be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to make a statistical
showing of disparate impact.9 7 The ECOA prohibits creditors from
asking applicants to indicate race, color, sex, marital status, religion,
national origin, or age except in credit transactions relating to the
purchase of residential real property.9 Because of this prohibition
virtually all ECOA plaintiffs attempting to rely on statistics to prove
an effects test case will be unable to do so. 9
One court has suggested that an ECOA plaintiff may prove discriminatory impact of a facially neutral, practice by a method other
than a statistical showing. In Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,100 the plaintiff, a female credit applicant, proved that the defendant had extended credit to twenty-five males with credit histories similar to hers. 10 1 The court declared that this evidence estab102
lished a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
The disparate treatment analysis of the Sayers court will be helpful to ECOA plaintiffs only in limited circumstances. The Sayers
plaintiff alleged disparate treatment which resulted in sex discrimi95. Id. at 1027, 1029-32. The ECOA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race. 15
U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1982).
96. Cherry, 490 F. Supp. at 1030-31. The plaintiff in Cherry attempted to prove disparate
impact by "showing that the percentage of applicants rejected in various low-rated zip code
areas correlated to the percentage of black population in each of [those] zip code areas." Id. at
1030. The court, however, found this proof deficient in two respects. First, such proof tested the
effect of Amoco's 38-criteria scoring system rather than testing the effect of the zip code criterion.Id. at 1031. Second, the plaintiff's proof did not address itself to Amoco's actual applicant
pool or an applicant pool that reasonably approximated the characteristics of Amoco's applicant pool. Id.
97. Id. at 1030. However, the Cherry court suggested that the plaintiff could have undertaken an analysis of demographic data to prove disparate impact. Id. at 1031. Most ECOA
plaintiffs would likely be unwilling to assume the burden of constructing a hypothetical applicant pool and compiling the statistical information needed to make such a showing in light of
the probability of an insubstantial recovery. Moreover, the suggested method of proving disparate impact would apply only to challenges of zip code ratings used in credit scoring systems.
98. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.5, .13 (1983).
99. Only those plaintiffs who have borrowed to purchase residential real property have
access to the necessary statistics. See id. § 202.13.
100. 522 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
101. Id. at 839-40.
102. Id. at 840. The defendant, however, established a defense by proving that each of the
25 males' credit files revealed them to be better credit risks than the plaintiff. See id. Each of
those 25,applicants either had prior dealings with the defendant or had sufficient equity in
their automobiles to insure the loan. Id.
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nation. One would assume that the plaintiff identified the twenty-five
male applicants in the defendant's records by their first names.' 0 If
the Sayers plaintiff had been alleging discrimination on any other
prohibited basis, however, she would not have been able to identify a
particular class of accepted applicants by virtue of facially non-discriminatory credit applications. 04 Thus, the Sayers analysis is apparently limited to disparate impact cases in which sex discrimination is
at issue.
Without statistics to prove disparate impact, plaintiffs will be unable to succeed in effects test cases. Thus, while the ECOA's general
proscription of inquiry into prohibited bases of discrimination serves
the purposes of the Act by reducing the likelihood of willful discrimnation, it also prevents plaintiffs from conclusively proving disparate impact.
III. A CALL FOR ACTIVE GOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY REFORM

Because of the relative ineffectiveness of private enforcement, the
attorney general and governmental agencies charged with enforcing
the Act' 0 5 must actively seek compliance with the ECOA. Federal
agencies have superior resources and greater expertise than individual plaintiffs' ° and are better equipped to investigate potential
ECOA violations. Moreover, these federal agencies are able to deter
credit discrimination by issuing cease and desist orders and revoking
the federal charters of institutions operating in violation of the
Act. 107 Nevertheless, agencies responsible for enforcement issued only
eight cease and desist orders during 1982,108 despite the fact that
one-third of the creditors investigated had not complied with the
103. This assumption is based on the fact that Regulation B prohibits creditors from asking about a credit applicant's sex. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1983).
104. Although names and courtesy titles could be used by ECOA plaintiffs to determine
gender and marital status, they generally would be of little or no utility in proving discrimination or any of the other prohibited bases.
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a) (1982).
106. See Gorman, supra note 19, at 1338-39. For example, the FTC has broad authority
to subpoena witnesses and require the production of documents during investigations. See 15
U.S.C. § 49 (1982). In addition, the FTC has used auditors to pose as credit applicants to
investigate creditors suspected of discrimination. Gorman, supra note 19, at 1339. This type of
investigation is most effective in determining whether discrimination is occurring in the early
stages of credit transactions. Id.
107. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d), 1730(e), 1730(f), 1786(e), 1786(f), 1818(b), 1818(c)
(1982).
108. Federal Reserve Board Annual Report on Equal Credit Opportunity and Truth-inLending, CONSUMER CRED. GumEn (CCH) 96,732, at 86,206 (May 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
FRB Annual Report].
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Act's provisions. 0 9

Unlike other federal agencies, the FTC has the power to bring
civil actions against creditors in violation of the ECOA."10 Although
the attendant civil penalties"' would seemingly have a deterrent effect on creditors, FTC enforcement proceedings remain highly selective. 11 2 During 1982, for example, the FTC brought formal enforcement actions against only two creditors." 3
The attorney general also has the authority to bring civil actions
and seek civil penalties. 1 1 4 The infrequency of these suits, however,
greatly diminishes whatever deterrent impact such civil penalties
may have on creditors. Between 1976 and July of 1982, the Attorney
General filed only twelve suits against creditors." 5 Thus, although
federal agencies and the Attorney General possess the means to seek
creditor compliance with the ECOA and deter credit discrimination,
their recent efforts indicate the need for a more active role in enforcing the ECOA.
Additionally, two reforms should be made to the ECOA's statutory and regulatory framework to lessen the burdens faced by plaintiffs in bringing successful private actions. First, the Act should be
amended to include a minimum recovery provision ensuring plaintiffs
a minimum recovery of $500 upon proof of an ECOA violation." 6
Such a provision would directly address the problems plaintiffs face
in proving and quantifying actual and punitive damages. Without
statistical data to prove disparate impact, however, many plaintiffs
109. See id.
110. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b, 1691c(c) (1982). The FTC also has the authority to seek damages for individual victims of illegal credit discrimination. Id. § 57b(b). The FTC has yet to
invoke that authority, however. Gorman, supra note 19, at 1339 n.20. In contrast, the Attorney
General cannot seek damages for victims of credit discrimination. See United States v. Beneficial Corp., 492 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1302 (3d Cir. 1981).
111. For example, in 1980 the FTC prepared a case against the Amoco Oil Company. See
Gorman, supra note 19, at 1345. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 56(a) (1982), the FTC notified the
Attorney General of its intent to file the civil action against Amoco. The Justice Department
then intervened and brought the suit. See Gorman, supranote 19, at 1345 & n.36. Amoco later
entered a consent decree which imposed a $200,000 civil penalty on the company. See FTC
Newsletter (Apr. 29, 1980).
112. See Braasch, Miller & Rice, supra note 15, at 1248.
113. See FRB Annual Report, supra note 108.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (1982). Cases brought by the attorney general have also
resulted in the imposition of substantial civil penalties. In an action brought against Montgomery Ward & Co. the defendant had $175,000 in civil penalties imposed on it in a consent judgment. United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., CONSUMER CR_. GUmE (CCH) t 97,732, at
87,189 (D.D.C. 1979).
115. See Gorman, supra note 19, at 1345.
116. See Reizenstein, supra note 1, at 247; supra note 24, at 374; Note, The Equal Credit
OpportunityAct Amendments of 1976: A Meaningful Step Toward the Eliminationof Credit
Discrimination,26 CATHL U.L. REv. 149, 165 (1976); Note, Equal Credit: You Can Get There
From Here - The Equal Credit OpportunityAct, 52 NiD.L. Rlv. 381, 401 (1975); supra note 2.
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will be unable to prove a violation. Any encouragement of private
actions effected by a minimum recovery provision would be negated
by the tremendous difficulty faced by plaintiffs who must increasingly rely on the effects test. Thus, the second reform would establish
a system to assimilate data concerning credit applicants' race, sex,
marital status, age, and national origin which would monitor any statistical discrepancies in the credit-granting process."'
Congress could amend the Act and Regulation B pursuant to one
of the three following alternatives. The first alternative would adopt
a system similar to that presently used in mortgage loan transactions. 118 To monitor ECOA compliance, all credit applications would
request information relative to race, sex, marital status, age and national origin. As under the current mortgage loan information gathering system, creditors would disclose that the purpose of the questions
is to gather monitoring information and that applicant response is
optional.
Although such a system requires the applicant to expend little additional time or effort, it does arm the creditor with information
which, in the credit evaluation process, may increase the likelihood of
willful discrimination. Nevertheless, this criticism loses credence
when the credit application process is viewed practically. In face-toface transactions with creditors, the applicants' race and sex are apparent, with marital status, age, and national origin often easily discernible as well. Moreover, information relative to age and marital
status is contained in applicants' credit histories which are readily
available to creditors at local credit bureaus. Requesting applicants
to provide monitoring information on credit applications would
therefore not seem to significantly increase the danger of willful discrimination in the credit granting process.
If willful discrimination is deemed too likely under the first alternative, a second method of acquiring monitoring information could
be established. This method would require creditors to supply applicants with a form by which the applicant provides the necessary data
and which is mailed directly to the appropriate administrative agency
designated on the form." 9 Of course, the success of this system is
contingent upon the cooperation of credit applicants, who may lack
117. Regulation B currently provides for the collection of such data on credit applications
for the purchase of residential real property. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (1983). Under the Regulation B
provision creditors must disclose that the requested information is voluntary and for monitoring the ECOA. Id.
118. See supra note 116.
119. In face-to-face credit transactions the form could be given to the applicant when he
applies. Alternatively, the form could be enclosed with credit applications sent to applicants
solicited by mail.
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either the willingness or motivation necessary for the compilation of
reliable statistical data. A third alternative would require that creditors supply their applicants with an addressed, postage paid card requesting the necessary monitoring information. Individual creditors
jointly or separately assume
and the federal government would either
120
the expense of the data collection.
The first and third alternatives are most likely to provide administrative agencies with complete applicant information for monitoring
compliance with the Act. The acquired information would then be
available to private plaintiffs upon request. In enacting either the
first or third alternative, Congress and the Federal Reserve Board
must weigh the danger of potentially willful discrimination against
the administrative costs inherent in the third proposal. Whichever
method is implemented, the acquisition of a central data bank is necessary to provide administrative agencies and private plaintiffs with
the requisite statistical information to facilitate enforcement and ensure compliance with the Act.121
IV. CONCLUSION
In amending the ECOA Congress recognized that strong enforcement is essential to achieve the Act's purposes. 22 The intended
mainstay of the enforcement scheme, private actions, has been an ineffective enforcement device. Difficulty in proving and quantifying
damages and insubstantial damage awards have discouraged private
plaintiffs from bringing suit. The procedural difficulties in bringing a
class action have prevented the successful litigation of a single class
action suit. 23 Finally, the nearly impossible burden facing plaintiffs
in proving disparate impact has effectively reduced the number of
private actions. Active governmental enforcement is needed to compensate for the failure of the private enforcement tool. Additionally,
the suggested statutory and regulatory reforms are needed to make
private actions an effective means of deterring credit discrimination.
120. To squelch creditor complaints concerning the cost of such a monitoring system, the
government could pay all or part of the costs. Funds paid by defendants in civil penalties could

be used to defray the costs.
121.

Commentators have noted that "[a] written record forms the basis of effective reme-

dial activity, and .

..

remedial activity is extremely difficult without documentary evi-

Braasch, Rice & Miller, supra note 15, at 1252. After the Office of the Comptroller
dence ....
of Currency was forced to recognize this statement's validity, it established the Fair Housing
Home Loan Data System. See ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EQUAL CREDrr OPPORTUNrry Acr FOR THE YEAR 1980 at 9 (Feb. 2, 1981). The system collects and analyzes data obtained
from individuals who apply for residential real property loans. Braasch, Rice & Miller, supra
note 15, at 1253-54.
122. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
123. See Gorman, supra note 19, at 1336.
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